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Abstract—Objectives of this paper are: briefly examine solutions 
applied in other network industries and based on that, set the 
policy and pricing context for development of market-based 
mechanisms for strategic air traffic re-distribution to avoid 
congestion, which is a main goal of SATURN project. Further, 
focus on current and possible future ATM pricing policy goals, 
by summarising current practice in Europe and introducing two 
possible future scenarios developed within the project. The 
implementation plan is outlined, discussing both the modelling 
challenges and the parallel consultation and validation processes. 
We conclude with a short look ahead.  
Keywords-market-based mechanisms; pricing; ATM; pricing 
environment; centralised scenario; decentralised scenario. 
Foreword—This work is part of SATURN project and as such 
co-financed by EUROCONTROL acting on behalf of the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking (SJU) and the European Union as part of the 
SESAR Exploratory Research programme. Opinions expressed in this 
work reflect the authors’ views only. EUROCONTROL and/or the 
SJU shall not be considered liable for them or for any use that may be 
made of the information contained herein. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. The challenges of congestion 
At the current rate of growth, EUROCONTROL estimates 
that air traffic in Europe is likely to increase by 50% in the 
next 20 years [1]. Today, demand-capacity imbalances are an 
issue for several airports and area control centres (ACCs), 
despite numerous initiatives to mitigate this problem. 
In Europe, the provision of air navigation services (ANS) 
is paid through the route charges that represent the 
remuneration for the costs of en-route ANS provision, 
including EUROCONTROL costs, applying a harmonised 
route charging system in the EUROCONTROL area. The 
common system for billing and collection of route charges is 
operated by the EUROCONTROL’s Central Route Charging 
Office (CRCO). 
Signatory states of the Single European Sky (SES) 
agreement, set unit rates based on recovery of a priori 
determined costs for given ‘reference’ periods within their en-
route charging zone (the so-called ‘determined’ cost system). 
The other nine EUROCONTROL states base their unit rates 
on a full cost recovery system. 
Currently, demand-capacity imbalances are mainly 
managed through strategic and tactical capacity-side 
interventions, followed by tactical demand management 
measures where needed (mostly air traffic flow (and capacity) 
management – ATF(C)M – slot delays). Not only are 
substantial costs thus imposed on airspace users [2], often 
coupled with unfair effects of capacity allocation methods, but 
users are also typically left with no choice but to comply with 
the imposed solutions. 
B. Objectives of this paper 
Effective use of already available resources is a less costly 
alternative to infrastructure capacity expansion. The current 
regulatory setting [3] allows the modulation of route charges 
in order to deal with airspace congestion. This is one way of 
applying market-based demand management [4, 5]. Other 
mechanisms include, but are not limited to, tradable permits, 
and yield management. All these principles are already known 
in various forms to the air transport industry at large, although 
not yet to the management of air traffic demand-capacity 
imbalances per se. 
In this context, the objective of the WP-E SATURN 
(Strategic Allocation of Traffic Using Redistribution in the 
Network) project is to propose and test realistic ways to use 
market-based demand-management mechanisms to 
redistribute air traffic in the European airspace. The project is 
exploring centralised and decentralised, deterministic and non-
deterministic, pure and ‘hybrid’ pricing mechanisms to 
alleviate demand-capacity imbalances. Before summarising 
the objectives of this paper, we make some basic definitions. 
• Operational environment – an operational framework
for ATM (including who controls the pricing), the
system’s objectives / policy goals (e.g. with respect
to cost recovery and congestion), and the regulatory
setting;
• Pricing (framework) – type and modulation (if any)
of the tariffs, how the prices are set strategically and
collected tactically;
• Scenario – combined context of the environment and
pricing (usually refers to a future case);
• Mechanism – protocol (set of rules) for implementing
a scenario (more than one mechanism may be
effected within a given scenario).
Figure 1 below depicts the relations between the terms 
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environments. Operational environment is not something we 
control, but it is our choice of probable future operational 
environments. The choices are rather high-level and take into 
account only the control and the pricing strategy objectives. 
Turning to the bottom part of the figure, shown mechanisms 
result in the pricing framework. Pricing framework and 
operational environment are input to, or better to say they 
define a given scenario. The scenarios are further developed in 
mathematical models. It is important to note that a given 
mechanism could result in more than one pricing framework. 
On the same note, the same pricing framework could be input 
in more than one scenario.  
 
 
Figure 1. Relations between operational environments, scenarios, 
pricing and mechanisms. 
The objectives of this paper are to first set the policy and 
pricing context in Section II, briefly examining solutions 
applied in other settings, before focusing on ATM policy 
goals. In Section III, current practice in Europe is summarised 
before two scenarios are presented in some detail, which we 
intend to investigate in SATURN. Section IV outlines the 
implementation plan, discussing both the modelling challenges 
and the parallel consultation and validation processes. The 
paper concludes with a look ahead in Section V. 
It is to be emphasised that SATURN addresses the post-
SESAR situation, e.g. with respect to a 2030 time horizon – 
that is, solutions that may be implemented in the longer term. 
We are thus not constrained by current operational limitations 
or the policy climate. 
II. POLICY AND PRICING CONTEXTS  
A. Network pricing mechanisms1 
The market in network industries is generally composed of 
an infrastructure manager/owner (who may also act as a 
                                                          
1
 This section presents a brief summary of the work undertaken so far in 
SATURN exploring numerous pricing theories. (We will subsequently publish 
other works on this topic in greater detail, drawing on the project 
deliverables.) 
regulator), one or more service providers, and the consumers. 
This structure is similar to the theoretical model of a 
monopolistic market.  
Congestion in a network occurs whenever one or more 
links or nodes are tasked to carry more flow than they are able 
to accommodate. As a consequence, the quality of service 
deteriorates, leading to various disadvantages for the users, 
such as: delays, increases in transport costs and, ultimately, 
denial of service. 
In general, users are willing to minimise their cost for 
using the network (in terms of time and money) and 
congestion generates externalities. Marginal cost pricing is 
usually regarded as the way to internalise the cost of 
congestion. A negative externality (referred to as ‘user 
externality’), results from the difference between the marginal 
social cost and the marginal private cost. In network 
industries, the ‘first-best’ pricing principle states that a toll 
equal to the user’s externality (a Pigovian tax) should be 
charged on each link in order to obtain the optimal network 
traffic-flow configuration [6].  
However, estimating marginal costs for actual 
implementation is, in general, difficult. The required 
information includes consumers’ price elasticities and cross-
price elasticities. Nevertheless, consumers are usually very 
reluctant to (directly) reveal their willingness to pay. If 
marginal costs are considered only in the short term, they do 
not cover the costs of upgrading the infrastructure, for 
example. 
So-called ‘second-best’ pricing regimes are thus generally 
preferred for pricing in real networks. One example is Ramsey 
pricing (RP), the aim of which is to maximise social welfare 
under the constraint of deficit coverage. RP relies on the fact 
that the service can be differentiated across the area of the 
network, time, and customers’ needs. This is difficult to 
implement since it also relies on marginal cost information. 
Peak load pricing, commonly applied in utilities and public 
transport, is a simplified case of RP. Users are charged for 
marginal and capacity costs in an environment where demand 
peaks, and consequently capacity shortages, are easy to 
predict. The resulting pricing scheme is usually differentiated 
by off-peak, peak and (sometimes) shoulder periods. 
Fully distributed cost regimes take marginal costs as a 
starting point and cover the economic deficit by allocating the 
remaining costs proportionally (e.g. by considering users’ 
utilisation, revenues, or the marginal costs themselves). This 
approach ignores demand elasticities and delivers lower 
theoretical revenues than RP. 
Congestion charges are common in urban transport 
contexts, for example. It is often argued that they tend to 
penalise users with lower income. Hence, several non-
monetary pricing schemes have been proposed in order to 
grant equal rights to all users. These schemes, in general, 
initially endow freely the credits or travel permits that are then 
used for travel in peak times. The equity issue is thus 
transferred to the initial endowment of credits or permits 
among users. An overview of non-monetary pricing schemes 
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classifications proposed in [8] and [9] to build a simplified set 
of criteria for categorising pricing techniques across network 
industries, specifically data transmission networks, electricity 
generation, distribution and retail, road, air and rail transport, 
with the goal to determine which of the techniques are 
adaptable and applicable for air traffic management. Table I, 
shown in [10], details the classification criteria included in the 
pricing framework. (All options per criterion are mutually 
exclusive, with the exception of criterion 8.) 
TABLE I.  PRICING FRAMEWORK 
Operational environment-related 
1. Control 





based with a 
regulator 




consumption oriented c. Both 2(a) and 2(b) 
Pricing-related 
3. Type of 
tariff 
a. Flat: a fixed fee gives unrestricted access to the 
network 
b. First-best: based on exact marginal costs i.e., users 
pay proportionally to the load they impose to the 
network 
c. Second-best: not based on exact marginal costs, i.e., 
average tariff for all users 
d. Multi-part: any combination of 3(a)-(c) 
4. 
Modulation 
of the tariff 
 
a. Time and space invariant: the network is tariffed in 
the same way all the time 
b. Time-dependent, space invariant: prices can vary 
according to time 
c. Time-invariant, space dependent: prices can vary 
according to location in the network 
d. Time and space dependent: the network is tariffed 
according to location and time 
5. Users 
classification 
a. No differentiation: all users are equal 




a. Customer-perceived value: willingness to pay 
determines the price 
b. Resource-estimated value 
c. Both 6(a) and 6(b) 
7. Payment 
a. Monetary 
b. Non-monetary: e.g. credits or permits 
c. Hybrid monetary/non-monetary 
8. Quality of 
service 
a.i. Best effort a.ii. Guaranteed 
service a.iii. Variable 
b. Capped service, e.g. capacity-constrained 
c. Compensation for service denial 
 
The first two criteria of the pricing framework describe the 
network industry’s operational environment in which the 
pricing technique, or pricing mechanism is applied. Other 
criteria are pricing-related. First pricing criterion (3) is related 
to the Type of tariff applied in the network: flat, first-best, 
second-best or the multipart, which is the combination of the 
previous types. The Modulation of the tariff classifies different 
methods that can be applied for tariff modulation. 
It is important to see how the network users are treated. Are 
they all equal, or a differentiation of users in different classes 
is applied (criterion 5)? Price setting strategy criteria describes 
the scheme behind the price setting for network use: customer 
willingness to pay, resource estimated value, or the mix of 
both schemes. 
Payment of the use of network resources can be monetary 
(most common), non-monetary (i.e. credits or permits), or a 
hybrid. Each pricing-related method is linked with a certain 
quality of service provided to the network users. Such levels 
of service could be broadly categorised as: best effort; 
guaranteed (minimum) service; variable; capped service 
(capacity cap); or, compensation for service denial. Quality of 
service is often reflected through performance metrics and key 
performance indicators (KPIs), as we will pick up again in 
Section IV(B). 
B. ATM policy goals 
Building on initiatives in the late 1990s, proposals were 
formed to create a Single European Sky (SES), to reform the 
architecture of European Air Traffic Control, to meet future 
capacity and safety needs. The SES is designed to remove 
national boundaries in the air, i.e. to create a single airspace, 
and to bring about: (i) improving safety tenfold; (ii) tripling 
airspace capacity; (iii) reducing air traffic management costs 
by 50%; (iv) reducing the environmental impact of each flight 
by 10%. 
In 2004, the Single European Sky I (SES I) package was 
adopted, with the launch of the technological programme, 
SESAR, in 2007, to enable the envisioned objectives. A 
second SES package (SES II), adopted in 2009, brought 
additional tools to drive performance and expedite the desired 
reform of the European ATM system: a revised approach to 
stimulate integrated service provision, a process of target-
setting for performance objectives and the establishment of the 
Network Manager (NM) to coordinate actions at the European 
network level [11]. Two inter-related implementing 
regulations stem from these efforts, and are already in effect 
(partially): IR 390/2013, laying down a performance scheme 
for air navigation services and network functions, and 
IR391/2013 laying down a common charging scheme for air 
navigation services. Performance scheme introduces the 
feature of incentives that are aimed at all stakeholders, with 
the goal to better the overall performance of ANS provision. 
Coupled with that, the charging scheme allows  the creation of 
charging zones that are different from the current State zones, 
and offers a possibility of modulation of route charges to deal 
with the capacity shortage in the peak-demand periods. 
The European ATM Master Plan describes “the agreed 
roadmap connecting research and development with the 
deployment within the SES technological pillar” [12] thus 
delineating the intended improvements to be brought about 
through SESAR deployment. The Plan describes four 
implementation phases: the deployment baseline, Step1, Step 
2, and Step3. Each of the steps foresees improvements 
building on the previous steps. 
The goal of these changes is thus to increase capacity and 
safety, and to reduce emissions and the cost of provision of 
services. However, an assessment of the impact of various 
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its absence. This underlines the need to consider and evaluate 
appropriate pricing frameworks, to which we turn our 
attention in the next section. 
III. CURRENT AND FUTURE ATM STRATEGIES 
Here, we apply the pricing framework of Table 1 to 
describe the current European ATC setting and to introduce 
two possible future scenarios (a term defined in Section I(B)), 
to be explored in SATURN. Several others are also under 
consideration, the characteristics of which we will briefly 
mention in Section III(B). As mentioned in the introduction, 
SATURN addresses the post-SESAR situation – i.e. solutions 
that may be implemented in the longer term. We are thus not 
constrained by current operational limitations or policy. 
A. Current pricing scheme in Europe 
Currently, EUROCONTROL’s CRCO  is responsible for 
collecting en-route charges and redistributing them to national 
air navigation service providers (ANSPs) in European airspace. 
Charge setting was outlined in Section I(A). From the 
economic point of view, the current environment is a 
monopolistic competition, where competitors (ANSPs) are 
differentiated on a location basis (country boundaries) and 
competitors’ pricing policies are not taken into account. 
 
Current pricing scheme – key features 
Operational environment 
1.(b). Decentralised control (distributed administrative): unit 
rates are formally set by the ANSPs and collected by CRCO. 
So, effectively, ANSPs provide an input in terms of their 
determined costs, and have hardly any other impact on the 
setting of unit rates. It is also to be noted that the SES 
performance scheme has established compulsory cost-
efficiency targets, which, in turn, effectively drive unit rates. 
2(a). Objective of cost recovery: en-route charges are 
collected to recover operational costs of national ANSPs for 
ANS services. Linked to binding performance targets. 
Pricing 
3(c). Consumption-proportional: yearly adjusted unit rates; 
4(c). Space dependent and time independent: unit rates vary 
by country (although EU Reg. 391/2013 Art. 16 allows 
national unit rate modulation and alignment among countries 
belonging to the same Functional Airspace Block [5]); 
5(a). No differentiation among customers: all airlines are 
equal; 
6(b). Prices are set according to resource value: cost of ANS 
services; 
7(a). Monetary payment; 
8(a) and (b). Guaranteed service, capped by ATC sector 
capacity by imposing ATF(C)M delays (applied on the day 
of operation). 
 
The current pricing scheme of European airspace, is 
conceptually similar to distance-based pricing (road transport) 
[6] and simple charges (rail transport in many states) [13]. 
Edge pricing in telecommunications [14] also shares similar 
concepts, with the notable difference of usually being location-
independent. 
B. Exploring future scenarios 
SATURN is exploring several future scenarios and possible 
pricing mechanisms, ranging from pure pricing to “hybrid” 
ones. Here we present two scenarios: centralised and 
decentralised one, along with key features of two pure pricing 
mechanisms. We then further discuss other relevant aspects of 
pricing strategies for ATM that are being investigated in 
SATURN.  
1) Centralised tariff control 
This scenario represents an operational environment where 
prices are set and controlled by a central authority whose 
objectives are cost recovery of ANS expenses and reduction of 
network congestion, through the optimisation of network 
performance – primarily from capacity, environment and cost-
efficiency perspective, with no deterioration of safety. Network 
congestion being an operational problem inducing costly 
delays in the system, which are likely unevenly distributed 
thus jeopardising the equity in the system. This scenario 
represents a monopolistic environment having a central 
planner, ANSPs as operators and airlines as customers; this 
configuration is similar to that of rail transport in most 
European countries. 
 
Centralised tariff control – key features 
Operational environment 
1(a). Centralised control: tariff modulation is set and applied 
by the central planner; 
2(c). Objective of cost recovery & congestion reduction. 
Pricing 
3(c). Tariff is proportional to sector capacity; a second-best 
charging scheme is plausible; 
4(d). Modulation of tariff is space and time dependent, where 
modulated tariff is assigned to each sector-period, where 
period can be, e.g. 30 or 60 minutes. The modulation is 
chosen to reach desired network equilibrium conditions, 
reflecting resource scarcity; 
5(a). Equity is a priority; hence, user classes among airlines 
are not welcome; 
6(b). Prices are set according to  resource value: cost of 
capacity provision;  
7(a). Payment is monetary; 
8(a) and (b). Guaranteed service, capped by ATC sector 
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This is a centralised “optimal-mix” tolling scenario, where 
the central planner is setting tariff modulation on the whole 
network, with the goal to balance the demand with available 
capacities and, ultimately, optimise the network performance. 
“Optimal-mix” tolls are originally defined as those designed to 
encourage a fixed number of users to allocate themselves 
along the routes available to them so as to minimise total cost 
of travel [15]. The tariff modulation is set for each sector-
period, based on the demand. When filed traffic load for some 
network segments is likely to exceed their declared capacity 
during certain periods, the central planner modulates ANS 
charges to alleviate the upcoming capacity problem. By 
assigning positive or negative tolls (revenue neutral in sum) 
against users’ original route filings, the planner provides 
incentives for them to accept alternative routings. Thus, the 
planner takes advantage of available network capacities, and 
consequently maximises network performance. Network 
performance to be optimised, can be quantified as a vector of 
several key performance areas/indicators: capacity (reducing 
en-route ATFM delays), environment (seeking most direct 
routes) and cost-efficiency (minimising the cost of capacity 
provision). [16] These performance areas are a part of the 
current SES performance scheme. Airspace Users (AUs) 
respond to the pricing policies (tariffs) by choosing a routing 
option that minimises their operating and route charges costs.  
2) Decentralised tariff control 
In this scenario each ANSP is setting its own en-route 
tariffs - peak and off-peak, fixed to recover operational costs 
and reduce congestion within its own airspace. The ANSPs are 
acting independently. The central planner has a limited role 
(e.g., acting as a regulator in disputes between ANSPs). 
The main objective of this scenario is to reduce the load on 
the network by redistributing traffic in a balanced way, and to 
reduce the amount of delay on the network, by decisions on 
local level. Local level can be either ANSPs or Functional 
Airspace Blocks (FABs). This is basically decentralised peak 
load pricing scenario, where each ANSP or FAB is setting 
tariffs on the subset of the network it controls, with the goal to 
balance the demand with the available capacity. The 
ANSP/FAB sets the peak and off-peak tariffs based on the 
traffic demand over time. ANSPs/FABs have no influence on 
the actions of neighbouring ANSPs./FABs Airspace Users 
respond to the pricing policies (tariffs) of the ANSPs/FABs by 
choosing a routing option that minimises their operating and 
navigation costs.  
Decentralised scenario has some characteristics that are 
worth noting. The principle that allowing users to minimise 
their individual delays does not lead to a solution where the 
global network delay is minimised holds here as well, 
although on a regional scale. Optimising on regions of the 
network independently also does not lead to a system-level 
optimum. Therefore, this scenario cannot result in the system-
optimum solution.  
 
Decentralised tariff control – key features 
Operational environment 
1(d). Market-based control with a regulator: each ANSP is 
responsible for setting its own tariffs, the regulator applies 
them and acts in disputes between ANSPs.  
2(c). Objective of cost recovery & congestion reduction: each 
ANSP is responsible for its own airspace. 
Pricing 
3(c). Proportional to travelled distance, yearly adjusted rates. 
This is the off-peak tariff; 
4(b) and/or (d). The peak tariff is set for the peak periods, 
and/or network segments; 
5(a). Equity is a priority; hence, user classes among airlines 
are not welcome; 
6(b). Prices are set according to resource value: cost of ANS 
services in peak and off-peak periods; 
7(a). Payment is monetary; 
8(a) and (b) Guaranteed service, capped by ATC sector 
capacity. 
 
Furthermore, the level of knowledge each ANSP/FAB has 
on other ANSPs’/FABs’ actions and policies and the degree of 
collaboration and/or competition between neighbouring 
ANSPs/FABs are not specifically addressed within the 
described scenario, as we assume that ANSPs/FABs act 
independently. However, since ANSPs/FABs set peak and off-
peak tariffs influenced by both operational costs and users’ 
route choices while having no direct influence in setting other 
ANSPs’ pricing strategies, such a configuration represents, in 
fact, a competition with no information sharing. Which would 
be the case in the current setting, if the ANSPs would start 
applying peak load pricing. 
3) Further pricing options 
The two scenarios we presented here are pure pricing 
scenarios, mainly exploiting the modulation of charges. 
Modulated charges presented here, are a possible pricing 
instrument, already available under the current regulation 
IR391/2013 [5]. The modulation could be applied at national 
or FAB level, the objective of which is to deal with the 
capacity shortage in the peak-demand periods. 
More liberal pricing options can be thought of, aligned 
with the assumed role of the central planner and the 
foreseeable evolution of the ATM system. For instance, the 
application of the yield management techniques to the ATM. 
The main yield management task is the capacity management 
through an appropriate pricing strategy. In general, as the 
resource is consumed and time gets closer to its expiry date 
(i.e. for a flight, the scheduled departure date, after which no 
more tickets can be sold) the value of the residual capacity 
increases and, in order to maximise revenues, prices should 
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most features of markets where yield management is 
successfully applied. An example of a simple yield 
management policy could be applied to the sector capacity as 
the resource to be optimally allocated. Then, the airspace 
congestion is the negative externality coming from this 
allocation. Applying the yield management, the price for 
transit is increased after each accepted request to reflect the 
cost of the added congestion. 
As another example of more liberal pricing options, prices 
could be trajectory-based, i.e. attached to routes, rather than to 
airspace volumes (as today). Trajectory-based pricing would 
be more in line with the forthcoming trajectory-based 
paradigm of operations.  
Hybrid mechanisms are an option too, where a mix of non-
monetary and monetary options could be applied. For 
example, the cap-and-trade logic using the tradable mobility 
permits can be applied [18]. The permits can be distributed 
based on available capacity onto a known demand. The 
distributed permits can then be traded, if an airline wishes to 
obtain a better solution, which could be preferred routing, or 
giving up a preferred routing in return for compensation. 
Equity of all such measures is a key consideration. 
Interestingly, neither equity, nor related notions such as 
“equality” or “fairness” are explicitly addressed in current EC 
high-level policy statements. “Equity of access” is mentioned 
in passing in [19]. Mentions closest to equity include 
“access(ibility)” and “mobility” [20].  
However, a number of concepts are at hand for an 
equitable air traffic assignment. Firstly, one might establish 
“equality of outcome” as a principle [21]. Here users who save 
time, for example those assigned premium 4D routes, should 
pay higher charges and those who spend more time, (users re-
routed in space and/or time) should be paid by those causing 
their delay (or “displacement”). It is thus a delay versus “tolls” 
trade-off. Effectively, this means a willingness-to-pay 
principle on the “high end”, and a “congestion damages” 
mechanism [22] on the “low end”, where displaced users are 
partly compensated in monetary terms for their displacement. 
One of the results of the SATURN stakeholder consultation is 
the notion that the airlines would not be adverse to paying 
premium charges to get the premium service (e.g. priority and 
no delay in the case of bad weather), and thus offering a 
guaranteed service to premium customers. 
Another equity preservation option can be a system with 
memory over certain time horizon. Practically, this means 
taking account of broader perspective (e.g. by treating an 
airline as a user, rather than each flight individually). One 
would hereby try to make sure that all users (airlines) are 
treated as far as possible in an equitable manner over a chosen 
time horizon (e.g. peak period, a day, a week). Therefore, for 
example, an airline being assigned a “suboptimal” (less 
preferred) route for one of its flights would get some of its 
other flights “prioritised” as a compensation. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SATURN MODELS 
A. Towards model deployment 
The two described scenarios, as well as other scenarios, the 
characteristics of which were mentioned in the previous 
section, are currently being developed into mathematical 
models. All models share the same basic pricing rationale: 
charges are adjusted (by central planner and by ANSPs in the 
centralised and decentralised case, respectively) based on time 
and location of service consumption (resource use), in order to 
reach desired network equilibrium conditions. 
This equilibrium is usually reached through a bilevel 
optimisation approach [23] aiming to reconcile the 
perspectives of the network (system) as a whole and of 
network users. Preliminary studies relying on bilevel 
optimisation have already shown the appropriateness of such 
an approach to represent the interactions between ANSPs and 
airspace users [24]. The key assumptions shared by all 
mechanisms are listed below:  
• Fixed demand matrix, that is, fixed number of flights 
between any airport pair in the network. The intention of 
the proposed pricing mechanisms is not to scale down the 
total demand but to modify its spatial/temporal pattern to 
bring it in line with available capacities. 
• Infrastructure capacity constraints are known in advance, 
in terms of pre-defined airspace sectorisation and 
maximum number of aircraft which can enter each 
network segment (sector) per given period of time. 
• The finite set of possible (reasonable) 4D trajectories for 
each system client, meaning that a flight can only be 
“assigned” a 4D route from a pre-defined finite set of 
possible 4D routes. A 4D trajectory is a combination of a 
departure time and a physical route to be flown. 
Practically, one might interpret such an assumption in a 
following way: the set of possible 4D trajectories for each 
flight may consist of a “primary” trajectory (preferred by 
the carrier) and “reserve” trajectories, in case that the 
original one is unattainable for whichever reason. One 
could conceive a system in which carriers would submit 
more than one 4D trajectory during flight plan 
submission, linking to the notion of Alternate User 
Preferred Trajectories, as introduced in [25], or Ranked 
4D Trajectory, as introduced in [26] that is, they could 
themselves propose a few alternatives to their preferred 
trajectory, in case it becomes unattainable. It should thus 
be noted that the mechanisms also allow for routes that 
accrue some ground delay from the very beginning 
(meaning that two flight alternatives can differ solely in 
temporal dimension).  
• Users are rational decision makers aiming at minimising 
their operational costs. A deterministic approach is 
employed, assuming perfect users’ knowledge regarding 
route attributes (path choice). Therefore, it is assumed that 
carriers inevitably choose the cheapest 4D trajectory 
available.  
• Revenue neutrality is established as a desired principle, 
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profit or deficit for ANS, but to recover the cost of ANS 
provision. 
• Sector-period based tariffs. Since sector represents a 
primary operational component of airspace structure and 
can be considered an elementary component of ATM 
system, the capacity violations (i.e. the excess demand) 
are tackled by setting tariffs that vary both per sector and 
per time period. 
• Heterogeneous demand in terms of different aircraft 
types. Flights using different aircraft types will have 
different costs and consequently different sensitivities to 
imposed sector-period tariffs. 
 
The models are to be tested through computational 
experimentations on small- to large-scale instances (up to tens 
of thousands of flights) on regional and finally European 
scale. Performance of different pricing mechanisms, in terms 
of the validation plan introduced in Section IV(B), will be 
assessed relying on the same input instances, based on real 
data. The impact of SATURN strategic choices on tactical 
flight decisions will be assessed through the CASA algorithm, 
currently used by the Network Manager to allocate Air Traffic 
Flow Management slots in case of congestion on the tactical 
level. The assessment will rely on the ISA/CASA algorithm 
available in the NEST software provided by 
EUROCONTROL.  
B. Consultation and validation 
As mentioned in Section II(A), quality of service is often 
reflected through general performance metrics and KPIs. In 
order to demonstrate the validity of the designed mechanisms, 
a quantitative assessment framework has been developed. This 
framework comprises new indicators and established 
indicators that are aligned with the EU Performance Scheme 
(second reference period) and SESAR Performance Targets 
[27, 28]. (Note that safety is out of scope in SATURN.) As 
shown in Table II, this set of indicators will measure 
environmental, cost-efficiency, capacity, 
punctuality/predictability and cost performance (cost of delay 
values will be furnished by updates made to [29]). Where 
possible, network-level values will be obtained from 
independent sources (primarily EUROCONTROL) for the 
above indicators for 2014, or reasonable estimations thereof 
will be made from external data.  
Fully developed models will be implemented on the traffic 
data of the chosen baseline days (2014). The implementation 
of the model will result in traffic distribution, and costs (as an 
example of an indicator) different from the current/baseline 
ones, as a particular mechanism and its instruments are 
applied through the model. The presented indicators will be 
calculated for the baseline (chosen days in 2014), and for each 
fully developed scenario/model. Therefore, the baseline, and 
each model will be described by a set of indicators that 
demonstrate the integrity of the model and/or mechanism, the 
difference between the model results and the baseline, and the 
differences between different models. It will be interesting to 
analyse how diverse market-based mechanisms impact 
interrelated indicators (e.g. capacity and horizontal flight 
efficiency). 
 













   
Cost efficiency: direct 
ANS cost per flight 
   
Cost: en-route service 
units 
   
Capacity: en-route 
ATFM delay 
   
Sector capacity 
utilisation 
   
Distribution of 
charges across airlines 
   
Cost of delay    
Departure punctuality    









Cancellations    
Variation in block-to-
block times 
   
Flight operation cost 
estimation 
   
 
The project team is consulting with stakeholders using a 
two-stage process. The recently completed first phase 
consulted stakeholders during the developmental and design 
stage of the project, before the mechanisms were finalised. For 
example, feedback from this stakeholder workshop indicated a 
willingness from airlines to pay a premium charge in order to 
receive a premium service (as mentioned previously) and, in 
principle, airlines would not oppose the modulation of charges 
provided the process is fair and transparent. In 2015, a second 
workshop will be held to consult with stakeholders on 
SATURN’s early results, to validate the indicators and 
modelling rules. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The expected outcome of SATURN is to provide major 
European ATM stakeholders with a clear understanding of the 
benefits and shortcomings, of the various pricing mechanisms 
available to be introduced mostly at the strategic and pre-
tactical level to smooth-out imbalances on the day of 
operations. This qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
applicability of the designed models in the near future draws 
upon extensive quantitative computational experimentations 
performed on regional and European scale airspace networks. 
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